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INTRODUCTION 
Like many landmark cases, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer1 
has become more important with age, the plaudits and critiques 
building a body of literature as influential as the case itself.2  
However, with every nuance dissected by generations of law students 
and scholars, the real world relevance of these cases can sometimes 
be lost, at least until the next big case that applies them.  Youngstown 
is no exception, and despite being one of the most cited and 
celebrated cases in American jurisprudence,3 two recent Supreme 
Court cases have quietly, and perhaps unintentionally, altered4 what is 
arguably the most famous aspect of Youngstown:5 Justice Jackson’s 
separation of powers framework for executive action.6
There are relatively few Supreme Court cases that directly address 
executive power,7 and before Youngstown there were very few that 
directly restricted executive action, at least where the Commander in 
 1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 2. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87, 88–90 (2002) (detailing the many casebooks and legal articles 
analyzing Youngstown and the various legal theories formulated to explain it). 
 3. See David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 
CONST. COMMENT. 155, 156 (2002) (finding Youngstown a landmark case “assured of 
immortality in the annals of constitutional jurisprudence”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 215, 217 (2002) (arguing that 
Youngstown is one of the most important cases of all time and comparing the case 
positively to Marbury v. Madison in terms of influence); William H. Rehnquist, 
Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 753 (1986) 
(describing Youngstown as a “very important constitutional case”). 
 4. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371–72 (2008) (changing the “zone of 
twilight” category for executive action by requiring a lengthy history of congressional 
support); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (holding that in 
Jackson’s third category the President cannot disregard congressional limitation on 
his power); infra Part III (analyzing the two cases and distilling a new standard for 
Jackson’s taxonomy). 
 5. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 3, at 224 (explaining that Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence has overshadowed Justice Black’s majority opinion in the eyes of legal 
scholars). 
 6. See infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (describing Justice Jackson’s 
taxonomy). 
 7. See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands 
and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 510 (2008) (pointing out that the powers of 
the other two branches of the federal government have received much more judicial 
inquiry); cf. Thomas A. O’Donnell, Illuminating or Eliminating the Zone of Twilight:  
Congressional Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 
95, 96 (1982) (portraying the Supreme Court as being “reluctant to examine the 
President’s implied powers vis-a-vis Congress” for fear of touching on “political 
questions”). 
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Chief power was concerned.8  Youngstown is famous for being both an 
implicit assertion of judicial review of executive action9 and an 
explicit defense of congressional supremacy in legislative and 
domestic affairs.10  However, it is Justice Jackson’s classification of the 
strength of executive power based on congressional action or 
inaction, his tripartite taxonomy, that dominated subsequent 
separation of powers jurisprudence.11
Justice Jackson broke his framework into three categories.  The 
first category applies when the President “acts pursuant to an express 
or implied authorization of Congress;” then his authority is at its 
apogee, essentially representing the federal government as an 
undivided whole.12  The second category is applicable when the 
President “acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority” and there is a “zone of twilight in which he and Congress 
may have concurrent authority.”13  The third category is relevant 
when the President “takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress;” in that situation he may rely “only upon 
his constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress.”14  Although not initially adopted by the Court, Jackson’s 
taxonomy is now recognized as the appropriate framework for 
analyzing nearly all executive action,15 and accordingly a change in 
the application of the taxonomy could affect the treatment of 
executive powers in future cases. 
 8. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (remarking that the case was one of the 
few times the Supreme Court refuted presidential power in a time of war (citing 
Louis Fisher, Foreword to MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE:  THE 
LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER, at ix (Duke Univ. Press 1994))); Heather J. Enlow, 
Note, Inward v. Outward:  The Limits of Presidential War Powers in the Domestic Sphere, 4 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 484 & n.6 (2006) (citing Ex Parte Merryman as the only 
major example where a court restricted executive power before Youngstown). 
 9. See Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (asserting that Youngstown is, among other 
things, remembered for the Court’s assertion of its authority to “review the legality of 
an executive action”). 
 10. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) 
(insisting that Congress is the sole legislator and that the President is obligated to 
“execute[]” the law). 
 11. See infra note 15 (citing two Supreme Court cases that explicitly adopt 
Jackson’s taxonomy as the appropriate lens to view executive action); infra note 64 
and accompanying text (explaining that Jackson’s concurrence is primarily known 
for his tripartite taxonomy). 
 12. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–36 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 13. Id. at 637. 
 14. Id. 
 15. E.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (“Justice Jackson’s 
familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive 
action.”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (“[W]e have in the 
past found and do today find Justice Jackson’s classification of executive actions into 
three general categories analytically useful.”). 
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The recently decided case of Medellin v. Texas16 is the latest 
Supreme Court case to affirm Justice Jackson’s three-part test as the 
appropriate framework to analyze executive power.17  Medellin is 
possibly better known for the Court’s characterization of the 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations18 
(“Optional Protocol”) as a non-self-executing treaty,19 and for the 
emergence of a new legal standard regarding treaties and their 
domestic effect.20  The majority’s other holding was just as 
important,21 although less controversial:  that the President did not 
have the power, either through treaty22 or his inherent foreign affairs 
power,23 to compel the state of Texas to give more judicial process to 
convicted Mexican nationals who did not receive consular access as 
required by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(“VCCR”).24  This holding is interesting not for the result but instead 
for the way that the majority applied Jackson’s taxonomy to analyze 
the President’s power. 
The Court in Medellin applied Jackson’s taxonomy to hold that the 
President’s attempt to enforce the decision of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) against Texas—based on authority granted by 
the Optional Protocol—fell into Jackson’s third category, which is 
applicable when the President takes an action contrary to Congress’s 
 16. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 17. Id. at 1368 (reiterating that Jackson’s taxonomy is the correct lens with which 
to view assertions of executive power). 
 18. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 
596 U.N.T.S. 487. 
 19. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 20. See id. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting that the new standard, 
which requires explicit statements from Congress that a treaty is self-executing, erects 
barriers to future treaties); Jordan J. Paust, Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, 
and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 328 (2008) 
(asserting that the majority uses the wrong test for self-executing treaties and ignores 
its own precedent). 
 21. Cf. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1390 (arguing that holding that the President does 
not have the power to enforce the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) decision has 
“broader implications than the majority suggests”). 
 22. Id. at 1371 (majority opinion). 
 23. Id. at 1372. 
 24. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, April 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (requiring that a signatory party notify nationals of other 
signatory parties of their rights to consular access “without delay” after arrest).  The 
ICJ held that the United States violated its obligations under the VCCR and ordered 
it to “provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the 
convictions and sentence” of the Mexican nationals.  Case Concerning Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 73 (Mar. 31).  President Bush 
attempted to enforce this decision on Texas through his Memorandum for the 
Attorney General of February 28, 2005.  Memorandum from President George W. 
Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
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expressly or impliedly legislated will.25  Underlying the Court’s 
holding is the principle that when Congress and the President take 
incompatible courses of action, Congress wins26 (a reasoning that 
confirms a similar assertion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,27 another recent 
Supreme Court case applying Jackson’s taxonomy).28  In addition, the 
Court in Medellin rejected the argument that the President’s foreign 
affairs power allows him to give domestic effect to the ICJ decision, 
holding instead that action in Jackson’s “zone of twilight” is only 
applicable when there is a long and confirmed history of 
congressional acquiescence to the specific executive action.29
This Comment will argue that the Court’s holding in Medellin 
modifies Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy by effectively eliminating the 
“zone of twilight.”  By requiring a “systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
before questioned,”30 the Court is essentially extending the first 
category—executive action with the express or implied authorization 
of Congress—to cover the middle “zone of twilight.”  This 
interpretation is at odds with the very purpose of the “zone of 
twilight,” which applies to situations not falling into categories one or 
three. 
In addition, this Comment will argue that Hamdan establishes 
Congress’s “disabling” power in the third category, which, combined 
with Medellin’s interpretation, creates a new standard for Jackson’s 
taxonomy, one more similar to Justice Black’s formalist majority 
opinion in Youngstown than Justice Jackson’s functionalist concurring 
opinion.31  Formalism can be described as “insisting upon a firm 
textual basis in the Constitution for any governmental act”32 and 
maintaining clear constitutional roles for the branches of 
 25. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1371. 
 26. See infra notes 151–153 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice 
Robert’s holding). 
 27. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 28. See id. at 593 n.23 (2006) (placing President Bush’s military commissions into 
Jackson’s third category where it automatically fails in the face of congressional 
disapproval (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 
(Jackson, J., concurring))); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-
Chief, and the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
933, 960–61 (2007) (arguing that Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan 
“skipped a few steps” by assuming that Congress automatically wins in third 
category). 
 29. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372. 
 30. Id. at 1371–72 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)). 
 31. See infra text accompanying note 169 (discussing Justice Black’s standard). 
 32. Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 
1523 (1991).  See generally id. at 1523–29 (describing, comparing, and analyzing 
formalist and functionalist arguments and cases). 
  
670 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:665 
                                                          
government,33 while functionalism allows governmental branches to 
share some responsibilities as long as they do not “interfere[] with 
the core functions of another” branch.34  Justice Black’s opinion 
insists on a clear constitutional basis for executive action or a clear 
legislative grant of authority to the executive by Congress, while 
Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” recognizes that in some cases the 
executive can take action without either.35  This Comment will argue 
that the new standard resembles Justice Black’s opinion more than 
Justice Jackson’s.36
Part II will give a background to Jackson’s concurrence in 
Youngstown, and the effect that his tripartite taxonomy has had on 
separation of powers issues, particularly focusing on the Court’s 
adoption and interpretation of the taxonomy in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan.37  Part III will analyze the Court’s treatment of the taxonomy in 
Hamdan and Medellin and argue that the two cases create a new 
standard, one that extends the first category to include a 
longstanding history of congressional acquiescence, eliminates the 
“zone of twilight,” and forecloses executive action in the third 
category.  Part IV analyzes potential ramifications of this new 
standard on the executive’s foreign affairs and war powers, and Part V 
concludes by calling for the Supreme Court to clarify whether the 
new standard established by Hamdan and Medellin was intentional or 
inadvertent. 
 33. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power:  The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 
679, 690 (1997) (maintaining that a formalist rubric assigns a certain function to a 
branch—such as legislative, executive, or judicial—and then all powers deriving from 
one of these functions are automatically and exclusively assigned to that branch). 
 34. Brown, supra note 32, at 1527; see id. at 1527–28 (stressing that functionalism 
fosters greater “interdependence” between the branches and greater judicial 
discretion to decide such cases). 
 35. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) 
(majority opinion) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem 
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”), with id. at 635-37 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (postulating that the Constitution bestows on the branches 
“separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity” and that in this 
interdependence there is a “zone of twilight” in which the President and “Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain”). 
 36. See infra Part III.B (remarking that the new two-part standard for executive 
power is more similar to Justice Black’s requirement of a statute or a textually based 
constitutional power for executive action rather than Justice Jackson’s three part test 
recognizing implied executive powers). 
 37. 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981).  Although previous Supreme Court cases had cited 
Jackson’s concurrence, Dames & Moore was the first to explicitly adopt his tripartite 
taxonomy.  See O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 99 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
had “ignored” Jackson’s tripartite framework until Dames & Moore); Charles Tiefer, 
War Decisions in the Late 1990s By Partial Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1, 17 (1999) (opining that Jackson’s concurrence received “authoritative” acceptance 
in Dames & Moore). 
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I. BACKGROUND OF JACKSON’S CONCURRENCE IN YOUNGSTOWN  
AND ITS EFFECT ON SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
In Medellin, Chief Justice Roberts authoritatively stated that “[t]he 
President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental 
power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself.’”38  This quote traces its origins to Justice Black’s 
majority opinion in Youngstown, perhaps the most famous separation 
of powers case in history,39 and stands for the unassuming notion that 
executive power has definitive limits.40  That Justice Black needed to 
make the statement at all reflects the great difficulty in defining the 
scope of the President’s powers41 and the historical tendency of the 
executive branch to assert the broadest possible interpretation of its 
powers.42  On June 2, 1952, the Supreme Court famously announced 
one limit on executive power:  President Truman could not, as an 
extension of his inherent Commander in Chief powers, seize private 
property in a way that directly contravenes procedures enacted by 
Congress.43  That this assertion seems unexceptionable now 
demonstrates the power and continuing effect of Youngstown.44
A. The “Steel Seizure” Case 
On April 8, 1952, President Truman told the nation that he was 
ordering Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize the nation’s 
steel mills.45  The undeclared war in Korea was raging on, and the 
fear was that an impending steel workers strike would hinder the war 
 38. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. 
at 585). 
 39. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 156 (stating that, after Youngstown, “all other 
[separation of powers] cases pale into insignificance”); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 215–
17 (arguing that Youngstown has influenced “nearly every constitutional issue of war 
and peace, foreign policy, domestic legislative power, presidential power, and even 
judicial power” occurring in the last fifty years). 
 40. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (emphasizing that Youngstown “reaffirmed 
the principle of presidential subordination to the rule of law”). 
 41. See id. at 163 (asserting that the issue of presidential inherent emergency 
power has “long been the subject of debate”). 
 42. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 7, at 506 (arguing that presidential power “has 
been expanding since the Founding,” in part because of the nature of the executive 
branch). 
 43. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89. 
 44. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008) (citing Jackson’s 
concurrence for support of the separation of powers nature of the Constitution); 
Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2220 (2008) (citing Youngstown to support a 
decision to rule on the merits because of the time-sensitive nature of the foreign 
policy issues in the case). 
 45. See MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE:  THE LIMITS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 80–84 (1977) (explaining that President Truman announced 
his intentions in a national radio address while concurrently signing Executive Order 
10340). 
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effort.46  Declaring that the closure of the steel mills would be a 
national emergency, the President cited his inherent powers as 
Commander in Chief47 and explained that the measures Congress 
had enacted48 were not sufficient to meet the emergency.49  The next 
day, attorneys for The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company filed a 
motion for a temporary restraining order of the President’s Executive 
Order.50  Less than two months later the Supreme Court decided 
Youngstown,51 a remarkable decision containing seven opinions, five of 
them concurrences.52
Justice Black, writing for the majority, penned a brisk and 
formalistic opinion categorically rejecting President Truman’s 
authority to seize the steel mills.53  After dealing with a non-
constitutional procedural issue, Justice Black began by framing the 
limits of executive power in terms of delegation by statute or explicit 
constitutional grant of authority.54  Justice Black found no statutory 
support for the seizure of the steel mills and stated that the 
legislation that authorized executive seizure of private property 
delineated conditions not met by President Truman’s Executive 
Order.55  Similarly, President Truman could not rely on his 
 46. Id. at 80. 
 47. See id. at 84 (observing that the Executive Order cited the President’s 
authority as based on “the Constitution . . . and as President of the United States and 
Commander in Chief”); id. at 119 (stating that the government’s reasoning was more 
fully explained as being based on “Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article II . . . and whatever 
inherent, implied or residual powers may flow therefrom”). 
 48. See id. at 122–23 (remarking that the President cited the Taft-Hartley Act, the 
Selective Service Act, and the Defense Production Act). 
 49. See id. at 80 (explaining that the President feared that measures under the 
Taft-Hartley act would have taken too long, and that there would have been a short 
interruption in steel production). 
 50. Id. at 102–03. 
 51. See id. at 83–84, 195 (relating that President Truman signed Executive Order 
10340 on April 8, 1952, and the Supreme Court released its ruling on June 2, 1952). 
 52. See generally Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 401–21 (2002) (listing the seven opinions and analyzing 
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions).  Justice Black wrote the opinion 
of the Court, with Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, and Burton joining in the 
opinion and writing separate concurrences.  Id.  Justice Clark joined in the 
judgment, but not the opinion, and also penned his own decision.  Id.  Justice Vinson 
wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Reed and Minton.  Id.  The opinions 
of Justices Clark, Douglas, Burton, and Vinson have had a minimal impact and are 
not analyzed in this Comment. 
 53. See Brown, supra note 32, at 1523, 1527 & nn.55, 59 (using Justice Black’s 
opinion in Youngstown as an example of formalism and contrasting it with Justice 
Jackson’s functionalist concurrence); Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 691 & n.28 
(labeling Justice Black’s opinion as an “exaggerated” and “stark” example of 
formalism).  But cf. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 225-26 (insisting that Justice Black’s 
opinion, although short, is a “masterpiece,” and completely compatible with Justice 
Jackson’s longer opinion). 
 54. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
 55. Id. at 585–86. 
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constitutional powers because the Executive Order seizing the steel 
mills was a legislative act that only Congress could take.56  Justice 
Black boiled executive power down to a two-part test:  does the 
President have the authorization of Congress, and if not, does he 
have power derived from a textual grant of the Constitution?57
Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion, in part because he 
felt that Justice Black’s opinion was too simplistic.58  While Justice 
Black appeared to view the situation in stark terms—either the 
President had the power or he did not—Justice Frankfurter refused 
to consider whether President Truman would have had the power to 
seize the steel mills had Congress never legislated on the subject.59  
What was crucial for Justice Frankfurter was that Congress had, at 
least in his opinion, legislated on the subject, and the President could 
not ignore the law.60
The majority and concurring opinions range from formalistic 
(Justice Black) to relatively functional (Justice Frankfurter).61  What 
united the Justices in the majority is the fact that Congress had 
legislated on the issue, and the President was compelled, at least in 
this case, to follow its wishes.62  Justice Jackson agreed with this basic 
 56. See id. at 587–89 (examining and rejecting the government’s constitutional 
arguments for an implied power based on an “aggregate of [President Truman’s] 
powers” under Article II of the Constitution because the executive order was an 
Article I legislative act); Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 691–92 (explaining that 
regardless of the source of the power Justice Black perceived President Truman’s 
usurpation of both policy and method as an inherently legislative, not executive, 
action). 
 57. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the 
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”). 
 58. See id. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he principles of the 
separation of powers seem . . . more complicated and flexible than . . . what Mr. 
Justice Black has written.”). 
 59. Id. at 597.  Justice Frankfurter appeared to want to limit the impact of 
Youngstown to the issue at hand, and his most influential statements have a 
functionalist and situation specific feel; see id. (“The great ordinances of the 
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.” (citing Springer v. 
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); id. at 610–11 
(“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as gloss on ‘executive 
Power.’”); see also MARCUS, supra note 45, at 203 (relating that “Frankfurter 
approached the merits of the case more narrowly” and resolved to “make no 
sweeping statement on presidential power”). 
 60. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 2, at 105 (positing that despite Frankfurter’s 
apparent disagreement with Black over the presence of implied presidential powers 
the dispositive fact was that Congress had legislated on the subject). 
 61. See Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 692–94 & n.33 (portraying Justice Douglas’s 
concurring opinion as being almost as formalistically “stark” as Justice Black’s but 
that the other majority opinions possessed varying degrees of flexibility). 
 62. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 2, at 99 (arguing that the case was decided not on 
whether the seizure was “a legislative act or on a rejection of broad presidential 
powers” but on the “perception that the President’s action . . . conflicted . . . with . . . 
Congress”); Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 696–98 (summarizing that all the justices in 
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assertion, and the reason his opinion became the one most 
celebrated in both courtrooms and classrooms alike63 was that, quite 
simply, he came up with a system.64
B. Justice Jackson’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Jackson prefaced his taxonomy by emphasizing the elastic 
nature of executive power.65  This concept, seemingly at odds with 
Justice Black’s rigid characterization of executive power, is placed in 
the context of a federal government that “disperse[s] [its] powers 
into a workable government.”66  His taxonomy should thus be 
analyzed with the mindset that the powers of the executive and 
legislative branches are not “‘hermetically’ sealed”67 but instead have 
an inter-relational nature, a concept that becomes most apparent in 
the “zone of twilight.” 
Justice Jackson’s first category placed the President at the apex of 
his powers when acting with the “express or implied authorization of 
Congress.”68  Jackson explained that in these situations the President 
represents the federal government as a unified body, and in order for 
the judiciary to overrule executive action it must decide that the 
government itself lacks the power.69  Jackson finished his description 
by stating that executive action under this category would be given 
the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation” and “supported by the 
strongest of presumptions.”70
 
the majority agreed that “the Constitution gives Congress alone the power” to seize 
the steel mills, and that by taking “legislative” action Congress pre-empted President 
Truman). 
 63. See Bellia, supra note 2, at 89 n.11 (citing a number of distinguished legal 
scholars who state that Jackson’s concurrence is the preferred jurisprudential lens 
with which to view separation of powers); Tara L. Branum, President or King?  The Use 
and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 62 (2002) 
(remarking that of all the opinions in Youngstown, “Justice Jackson’s concurrence 
may have been the most important”); supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text 
(listing court cases following and applying Jackson’s concurrence). 
 64. See, e.g., Bryant & Tobias, supra note 52, at 410 (explaining that although 
Jackson’s concurrence is important for many reasons, it is “principally renowned” for 
his tripartite taxonomy). 
 65. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, 
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”). 
 66. See id. (declaring that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches 
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity” and cannot be based 
on “isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context”). 
 67. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 121 (1976)). 
 68. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (stating that in the first category the 
President’s “authority is at its maximum” because it “includes all he possesses in his 
own right plus all that Congress can delegate”). 
 69. Id. at 636–37. 
 70. Id. at 637. 
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The third category in Jackson’s taxonomy showed the President’s 
power at its “lowest ebb”71 when the Executive takes an action that is 
clearly against the “express or implied” will of Congress.72  Jackson 
speculated that the Supreme Court would have to reject Congress’s 
power to act in the disputed area in order to “sustain exclusive 
Presidential control,” and that any claim to exclusive control must be 
carefully examined.73  Significantly, Jackson did not assume that 
Congress would always win in category three,74 although the examples 
he cited for presidential supremacy hinge on textual grants of power 
to the President in the Constitution rather than the implied powers at 
issue in the case.75
Finally, Jackson’s second, or “zone of twilight,” category references 
the first and third categories by analyzing executive action “in [the] 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of [executive] 
authority.”76  In these situations, the President must have some basis 
for independent constitutional power, but there also exists a “zone of 
twilight” where the President and Congress have overlapping or 
indistinct powers.77  In these situations, Jackson stated that a lack of 
congressional action may necessitate executive action.78  In addition, 
Jackson insisted that implementation of executive power in the “zone 
of twilight” would “depend on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables” as opposed to “abstract theories of 
law.”79  Although there are many opinions as to the exact meaning 
and application of the “zone of twilight,”80 it is, at a minimum, 
 71. See id. (insisting that the President “can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 637–38. 
 74. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 960 (remarking that Justice Jackson spent many 
pages of his opinion on whether President Truman’s actions might trump Congress’s 
statutes). 
 75. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 n.4 (using the President’s “exclusive power of 
removal in executive agencies” as an example (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52 (1926))). 
 76. Id. at 637. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. (theorizing that “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” 
could “enable, if not invite measures on independent presidential responsibility”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 112 (insisting that “zone of twilight” 
acquiescence requires “actual notice” to Congress of the President’s intentions and 
an opportunity for Congress to respond); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 230 (describing 
Jackson’s “zone of twilight” as a default rule when the line between presidential and 
congressional power is not clear); Rebecca A. D’Arcy, Note, The Legacy of Dames & 
Moore v. Regan:  The Twilight Zone of Concurrent Authority Between the Executive and 
Congress and a Proposal for a Judicially Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 291, 310 (2003) (arguing that precedent shows a “zone of concurrent 
authority” for which there is no legal standard or “clearly articulated principle”).  
The difficulty in defining a clear standard for the “zone of twilight” was foreseen by 
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defined by the absence of congressional action, positive or negative, 
and the presence of some constitutional basis for presidential 
power.81  Put a slightly different way, resorting to a “zone of twilight” 
analysis should occur only after an analysis under categories one and 
three is inconclusive.82
Jackson applied his taxonomy to the facts of Youngstown and 
immediately dismissed the possibility of the steel seizure falling into 
first category because Congress had never authorized it.83  Jackson 
eliminated President Truman’s action from the “zone of twilight” 
category because Congress had legislated in that area; President 
Truman chose a method inconsistent with the statutes passed by 
Congress and could not claim that his actions were “necessitated or 
invited” from the absence of congressional legislation.84  This left the 
steel seizure in the “severe tests” of the last category, where Jackson 
found no basis for presidential supremacy in the face of explicit 
congressional disapproval.85
Like the other Justices siding with the majority in Youngstown, 
Justice Jackson essentially held that President Truman was unable to 
seize the steel mills in the face of contrary legislation.86  What was 
revolutionary about his opinion was that he took what Youngstown 
stood for—a restriction of unbridled executive power and an 
affirmation of the separation of powers doctrine—and gave it a 
flexible matrix to apply to future cases.87  That Youngstown and 
Jackson’s taxonomy would be so important was by no means 
immediately clear,88 but thirty years after the Supreme Court decided 
 
Jackson when he said that any test will rely on “the imperatives of events” rather than 
on “abstract theories of law.”  Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637; see also Bellia, supra note 2, 
at 146 (referring to the preceding quote and remarking “[i]f Justice Jackson’s 
statement was purely predictive, he was right”). 
 81. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 230–31 (interpreting the “zone of twilight” as a 
rule of judicial deference applied when executive action is not unconstitutional but 
an analysis of the first and third categories does not provide an answer). 
 82. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (explaining that “[w]hen the President acts in 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority” he acts in a “zone of 
twilight”). 
 83. Id. at 638. 
 84. Id. at 639. 
 85. See id. at 640–55 (exploring and rejecting the government’s textual and 
implied powers arguments for the steel seizure). 
 86. Id. at 639–55 (placing President Truman’s Executive Order into the third 
category where it fails in the face of contrary legislation). 
 87. See id. at 635 (describing his taxonomy as an “over-simplified” but “practical” 
grouping for executive power). 
 88. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (“It is doubtful that even the most 
prescient of soothsayers could have foreseen the emergence of a landmark 
case . . . .”); Bellia, supra note 2, at 88 (reporting that the case seemed “destined to be 
ignored” (quoting Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., The Steel Case:  Presidential Responsibility 
and Judicial Irresponsibility, W. POL. SCI. Q. 61, 65 (1953))); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 
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Youngstown, Jackson’s taxonomy would take center stage in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan.89
C. Dames & Moore and the Application of Jackson’s Tripartite Taxonomy 
In the years after Youngstown, Jackson’s taxonomy had been 
analytically useful in lower court opinions,90 but in Dames & Moore, 
the Supreme Court explicitly adopted Jackson’s taxonomy, which 
until then was only dicta.91  The Supreme Court—in an opinion 
penned by then Associate Justice Rehnquist—applied Jackson’s 
taxonomy to analyze the balance of power between the President and 
Congress and unanimously upheld executive orders nullifying, 
voiding, suspending, and transferring U.S. claims against Iranian 
interests to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.92
The Court first held that the executive orders authorizing the 
nullification of attachments to Iranian property and the transfer of 
that property overseas fell into the first category of Jackson’s 
taxonomy because they were explicitly authorized by statute.93  
 
217 (explaining that the remarkable impact of Youngstown was not “obvious or 
inevitable in 1952”). 
 89. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 90. See, e.g., Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 224 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying 
Jackson’s taxonomy for the proposition that the President must rely on his own 
constitutional powers for any action taken that does not have the express or implied 
authorization of Congress); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 392 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Jackson’s third category for the concept that Supreme Court 
jurisprudence does not support deference to executive actions when they contravene 
congressional statutes); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 598 F.2d 759, 775 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that the government’s actions did 
not fall into Jackson’s “zone of twilight” because Congress had clearly legislated to 
the contrary). 
 91. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661, 669 (pronouncing that Jackson’s 
concurrence “brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as 
there is in this area” and that the Court found “Justice Jackson’s classification of 
executive actions . . . analytically useful”); see also O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 99 
(stating that the Supreme Court had “ignored” Jackson’s taxonomy until Dames & 
Moore); Mark S. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown:  Against the View that Jackson’s 
Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1703, 1711 n.22 (2007) (insisting that Dames & Moore, which adopted Jackson’s 
taxonomy, did not undermine its reasoning). 
 92. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669, 688.  Before getting to the substance of the 
opinion, Justice Rehnquist remarked generally about the purpose and scope of 
Jackson’s taxonomy, stating that there was a “spectrum” of executive action—
running from unambiguous “congressional authorization” to unequivocal 
“congressional prohibition”—that was particularly appropriate when dealing with an 
international emergency that Congress could not have anticipated.  Id. at 669.  This 
declaration echoes the functionalist outlook of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter in 
Youngstown.  See supra notes 59, 65–66 (quoting functionalist language in Justices 
Frankfurter’s and Jackson’s Youngstown opinions). 
 93. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669–75 (citing the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (Supp. III 1976)).  Despite legislative 
history that suggested Congress did not intend to give the President such “extensive 
power,” the Court held that the plain language of the statute gave the President the 
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However, the Court did not find congressional authorization for the 
President to “suspend” claims pending in court and therefore this 
action could not fall into the first category.94  Instead, the Court 
placed the suspension of claims into the “zone of twilight” category, 
arguing that the “general tenor” of congressional action indicated 
“acceptance of a broad scope for executive action” in these 
situations.95  The Court interpreted the entire history of congressional 
approval of executive claims settlement as tantamount to “a 
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned” which “may 
be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power.’”96  The Court drew this 
conclusion despite the fact that the Court cited no prior instances of 
the specific action taken by the President, the suspension of claims 
pending in federal district court.97
Legal scholars have criticized Dames & Moore for blurring the lines 
between Jackson’s three categories by “allowing congressional 
opposition . . . to be interpreted as congressional silence; or allowing 
congressional silence . . . to be interpreted as congressional 
approval.”98  This was viewed as betraying the very purpose of 
Youngstown, the restriction of executive power, by giving the President 
too much latitude.99  In addition, at least one scholar argued that the 
Court adopted a section of Frankfurter’s concurrence—“a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
 
very power that he was claiming.  See id. at 672 (“We . . . refuse to read out of § 1702 
all meaning to the words ‘transfer,’ ‘compel,’ or ‘nullify.’”). 
 94. Id. at 675.  The Court also distinguished several arguments to the effect that 
suspending claims pending in court actually falls into Jackson’s third category.  See id. 
at 681–86 (arguing that, despite the limiting and contradictory language of several 
congressional statutes, Congress had accepted presidential authority to settle claims). 
 95. Id. at 677–78.  First, the Court argued that just because the relevant statutes 
did not specifically approve suspension of claims, this did not mean that Congress 
disapproved, especially in the “areas of foreign policy and national security.”  Id. at 
678 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)).  Next, the Court asserted that 
the long history of congressional acquiescence and delegation in the area of 
international claims settlement shows that “Congress has implicitly approved the 
practice of claims settlement by executive agreement.”  Id. at 680.  Finally, the Court 
pointed to a series of statutes where Congress had either not questioned the 
President’s authority to settle claims disputes or explicitly authorized future 
settlements.  Id. at 680–83. 
 96. Id. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 97. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1165 (2008) (contending that the Court cited all pre-FSIA cases for 
congressional acquiescence and could show no previous instances of “presidential 
suspension of pending lawsuits”). 
 98. Bellia, supra note 2, at 145. 
 99. See D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 293–94 (describing Dames & Moore as a 
“politically motivated aberration” rather than a “clear application of Youngstown”). 
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Congress and never before questioned”100—as the definition of 
actions in the “zone of twilight.”101  The Court, however, appears to 
have used this quote as representative of congressional acquiescence 
of executive claims settlement agreements, rather than as a definition 
of “zone of twilight” situations.102
Despite the controversial nature of the Court’s opinion in Dames & 
Moore, it remained the most exhaustive application of Jackson’s 
taxonomy until Medellin, and although subsequent Supreme Court 
cases have cited Dames & Moore, none challenged its interpretation of 
Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy.103
II. HAMDAN AND MEDELLIN CREATE A NEW FORMALISTIC STANDARD 
FOR JACKSON’S TAXONOMY THAT ELIMINATES THE  
“ZONE OF TWILIGHT” CATEGORY 
In the years following Dames & Moore, legal scholars remarked on 
the use of Jackson’s taxonomy to expand executive power, pointing 
out the dichotomy of using a seminal case restricting presidential 
power to enlarge it.104  Recently, however, the Court has applied 
Jackson’s taxonomy to restrict the use of executive power; first in 
Hamdan and then in Medellin.105  This Part will argue that the Court’s 
application of Jackson’s taxonomy in Hamdan and Medellin creates a 
new standard for analyzing executive power that effectively eliminates 
the “zone of twilight” and requires the President to rely on a statutory 
 100. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11. 
 101. See, e.g., O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 111 (arguing that Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence helps to define Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” taxonomy).  
Although not the only interpretation of Dames & Moore, O’Donnell’s argument is 
prescient because Chief Justice Roberts appears to adopt this standard in Medellin; 
the crucial distinction is that while O’Donnell believed this standard would allow 
almost unlimited executive action, Chief Justice Roberts appears to use it to restrict 
most executive action.  See infra Part III.B (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts uses 
Justice Frankfurter’s language to bar actions in the “zone of twilight” not based on a 
longstanding history of congressional acquiescence). 
 102. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (detailing evidence 
supporting the executive orders and positively comparing it to the Frankfurter 
quote).  This interpretation is supported by the fact that Justice Rehnquist went 
through great pains to stress that Dames & Moore had been decided “on the 
narrowest possible ground,” which militates against the implementation of a general 
“zone of twilight” standard.  Id. at 660, 688. 
 103. Cf. D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 293 & n.9 (stating that Dames & Moore has 
become “part of the mainstream executive-powers jurisprudence” and listing a 
number of cases following it). 
 104. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign 
Affairs:  Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1311 (1988) (insisting that 
Dames & Moore “undercuts Youngstown’s vision of a balanced national security 
process”). 
 105. See infra Part III.A–B (observing that Hamdan held against President Bush’s 
military commissions and Medellin refused to enforce President Bush’s 
Memorandum). 
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grant of authority or a textual grant of power in the Constitution, a 
standard that more closely resembles Justice Black’s formalist opinion 
than Justice Jackson’s functionalist approach.106
A. Hamdan Implements a “Disabling” Congress Standard in the  
Third Category of Jackson’s Taxonomy 
Hamdan107 reveals a new understanding of Jackson’s third category 
by assuming that when Congress and the President disagree, 
Congress prevails.108  Jackson himself did not assume that when 
Congress and the President disagree that Congress necessarily wins, 
“disabling” executive action.109  Nevertheless, scholars have asserted 
that this assumption must follow from the structure of the 
Constitution and the relative roles of the executive and legislative 
branches,110 at least where constitutional powers are not involved.111  
 106. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) 
(majority opinion) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem from 
an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”), with id. at 635 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”). 
 107. The facts of Hamdan are briefly as follows:  The petitioner, Salim Ahmed 
Hamdan, was an enemy combatant captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and held by the 
U.S. military at the prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 566 (2006).  In 2003, Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit various 
offenses and tried by a military commission convened by President Bush.  Id.  
Hamdan brought habeas corpus and mandamus petitions asserting that President 
Bush lacked the authority to convene military commissions, and that the military 
commissions “violate[d] the most basic tenets of military and international law.”  Id. 
at 567.  The district court granted Hamdan’s writ of habeas corpus, but the court of 
appeals reversed, and Hamdan appealed to the Supreme Court.  Id. 
 108. See infra notes 126–132 and accompanying text (analyzing Hamdan and 
concluding that the principle of a disabling Congress is the most straightforward 
interpretation of Hamdan’s application of Jackson’s third category). 
 109. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that Jackson himself 
spent many pages discussing whether President Truman’s justifications trumped 
congressional will). 
 110. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 1703, 1714–16 (explaining that most scholars 
seem to accept a “categorical congressional supremacy,” a similar terminology to a 
“disabling” Congress). 
 111. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 88 
(2d ed. 1996) (describing various presidential powers, primarily rooted textually in 
the Constitution, over which Congress has no authority).  For instance, it is 
universally accepted that Congress could not tell the President where to move his 
troops during a war or enter into treaty negotiations against the will of the President.  
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President Shall be Commander and Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He 
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties . . . .”); HENKIN, supra, at 88 (emphasizing that even “champions of 
maximum Congressional authority” would not dispute the President’s treaty making 
or commander in chief powers). 
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The Supreme Court appears to adopt this interpretation of Jackson’s 
third category in Hamdan.112  
The Court in Hamdan did not attempt a thorough application of 
Jackson’s taxonomy, and Hamdan itself, particularly the majority 
opinion, is arguably better viewed as primarily a statutory 
interpretation case and not as a discourse on separation of powers.113 
Indeed, although the concurring opinions provide more substance to 
the constitutional issues in the case, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
only directly refers to Jackson’s taxonomy in a footnote.114
At issue in Hamdan was whether procedures enacted by President 
Bush for military commissions trying enemy combatants violated 
federal and international law.115  A majority of the Court held that the 
military commissions were unlawful because their “structure and 
procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(“UCMJ”) and the Geneva Conventions,”116 placing the commissions 
in Jackson’s third category despite the fact that it was not clear that 
Congress intended to restrict executive action in this way. 117
The question behind all of this is whether President Bush, as 
Commander in Chief, had the authority to convene military 
commissions regardless of contrary or inconsistent congressional 
legislation.118  Justice Stevens treated the debate as a minor, and 
apparently long-resolved, issue, devoting only a small footnote and 
 112. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 1709 (admitting that the theory of a disabling 
Congress may have been “settled” in part by Hamdan); Vladeck, supra note 28 at 939 
(stating that that the “elegant simplicity” of the disabling Congress theory is 
“thematically at the heart of the Hamdan opinions of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and 
Breyer”).  But see id. at 940 (suggesting that it may be “too simplistic” to read Hamdan 
this way). 
 113. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 957–58 (emphasizing that the majority never 
decided any “constitutional question,” but instead focused on the procedures 
enacted by Congress); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National 
Security:  Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (stating that Justice 
Stevens’s majority opinion “purported to adhere closely to the text, context, and 
history of the relevant provisions” rather than demanding an explicit congressional 
authorization for the military commissions). 
 114. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006). 
 115. See also id. at 567 (remarking that the most important issue was whether “a 
defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence against him”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 959–60 (suggesting that the evidence that the 
procedures enacted for military commissions were intended to be exhaustive was less 
persuasive than in previous executive powers cases).  This interpretation makes 
Hamdan a kind of anti-Dames & Moore.  See supra text accompanying note 98 
(explaining that the criticism leveled at Dames & Moore was that the Court was willing 
to interpret legislation that was arguably restricting presidential power as actually 
enabling executive action in the first and second categories of Jackson’s taxonomy). 
 118. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 957 (stating that “Hamdan thus squarely raised 
the question of whether congressional limits on presidential authority were 
enforceable”). 
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one citation to it.119  Justice Stevens asserted that “the President . . . 
may not disregard limitations that Congress has . . . placed on his 
powers,” and cited Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown.120  This 
citation to Jackson’s concurrence assumes that Jackson himself 
viewed the third category as a “disabling zone” where Congress 
necessarily wins, which is by no means apparent.121
Because Justice Stevens devotes such a small space to such a big 
topic, it would be tempting to write it off as dicta, but this point is a 
necessary part of the Court’s argument and thus has precedential 
value.122  Although Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion embarked 
on a more generous application of Jackson’s taxonomy,123 it also 
assumed that because President Bush acted in the third category, he 
had no choice but to follow Congress’s guidelines.124  Justice Breyer’s 
short concurring opinion contained no discussion of Jackson’s 
taxonomy but did explicitly affirm Congress’s disabling power over 
the President.125
The most straightforward interpretation of Hamdan’s application of 
Jackson’s taxonomy is that where Congress and the President 
disagree, Congress always wins, except perhaps where the President 
 119. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has 
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military 
commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise 
of its own war powers, placed on his powers.” (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))); see also Vladeck, supra 
note 28, at 935–36, 940 (suggesting that Hamdan’s apparent support of the 
congressional disabling theory was merely re-affirming the Supreme Court view 
prevalent before the rise of Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence). 
 120. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 121. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that Jackson did not 
make this assumption in Youngstown).  But see Rosen, supra note 91, at 1705–06 
(arguing the opposite:  that in the third category Jackson assumed that the 
“president is categorically bound to follow what Congress lays down”). 
 122. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 1710 n.21 (arguing that without this assumption 
the Court could not state that the military commissions were constrained by contrary 
statute).  This view was also supported by the concurring opinions of Justices 
Kennedy and Breyer.  See infra notes 123–125 (concluding that both Justice Kennedy 
and Justice Breyer found statutes conflicting with President Bush’s military 
commissions, and both held that the statutes prevailed).  
 123. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638–39, 643–44, 652–55 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(affirming Jackson’s taxonomy as “[t]he proper framework for assessing whether 
Executive actions are authorized” before concluding that the military commissions 
violated several provisions of the UCMJ and was thus in the third of Jackson’s 
categories, where it presumptively failed). 
 124. See id. at 643, 653 (asserting that the “special military commission . . . must 
satisfy Common Article 3[]” and “we must apply the standards Congress has 
provided”). 
 125. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Congress has denied the President the 
legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here.”). 
  
2009] FADE TO BLACK 683 
                                                          
can find a textual grant of power in the Constitution.126  This would 
apply both when Congress can point to a textual grant, as in 
Hamdan,127 and where the President and Congress have concurrent 
and relatively undefined powers, most noticeably in the foreign 
affairs and war powers fields.128  In addition, it would have been easy 
for the majority and concurring opinions in Hamdan to link 
Congress’s disabling power to its constitutional grants of power,129 but 
not one of them directly did.  Justices Kennedy and Breyer did not 
even discuss Congress’s source of power to make legislation in the 
field of military justice, apparently relying on Justice Stevens’s 
opinion.130  These bald statements of congressional supremacy make 
this interpretation the most obvious conclusion, arguably supported 
by the weight of scholarship.131  Finally, at least one circuit court judge 
appears to cite Hamdan for this interpretation.132
 126. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb:  Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
689, 737–38 (2008) (citing Hamdan’s footnote 23 and its assertion that Congress has 
a “virtually irrebutable presumption of supremacy” over the President in a dispute 
over war powers and suggesting that this supremacy might not apply to some 
executive power grounded in Article II); supra note 111 and accompanying text 
(pointing out that textually based constitutional powers are presumably 
uninfringeable). 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define and punish . . . Offenses against the 
Law of Nations . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (“To make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . .”); see Hamdan, 548 
U.S. at 591–92 (majority opinion) (counterbalancing congressional textual war 
powers against presidential textual war powers). 
 128. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 87 (“In foreign affairs, much of the authority of 
the federal government is not explicitly allocated to either branch, and even the 
explicit division of power between President and Congress conforms to no ‘natural’ 
separation of executive from legislative powers . . . .”). 
 129. See supra note 127 (citing the relevant constitutional provisions to 
congressional power in Hamdan). 
 130. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 653 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I see no need to 
consider several further issues addressed in the plurality opinion by Justice 
Stevens . . . .”). 
 131. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (asserting that most scholars 
support the basic assumption that Congress wins a conflict with the President).  But 
see Vladeck, supra note 28, at 9 (suggesting that another way to analyze Hamdan’s 
treatment of Jackson’s third category is to vary Congress’s disabling power on a 
sliding scale according to the source of the legislative power).  In the case of 
Hamdan, the congressional power to pass the legislation in question was drawn from 
textual grants in the Constitution and so would represent an absolute case of 
congressional supremacy.  Id.  Where power between the President and Congress is 
concurrent and undefined, the assumption of congressional supremacy might not be 
as strong.  Id.  Although a more flexible theory, the lack of a de facto winner where 
there is no “textual prerogative” to either side still leaves questions, and the 
statements of the majority and concurring opinions in Hamdan do not seem to 
recognize such fine distinctions.  See supra notes 119, 123–125 and accompanying text 
(citing the majority and concurring opinions and showing they give Congress a 
categorical disabling power).  Finally, because most executive war powers are 
implied, a hypothetical case where implied executive power defeats implied 
congressional power in the third category suggests an executive implied power 
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Hamdan suggested a new standard for Jackson’s third category but 
did not explore the “zone of twilight” at all, although Justice Stevens’s 
majority opinion left open the possibility that President Bush might 
have had the power to establish military commissions absent 
congressional legislation.133  In addition to being widely supported by 
legal scholars,134 the disabling Congress theory articulated by Hamdan 
might not have been, by itself, a dramatic alteration of Jackson’s 
taxonomy because it was already difficult for the executive branch to 
overcome a congressional mandate.135  Medellin, however, embarked 
on the most extended application of Jackson’s taxonomy by the 
Supreme Court since Dames & Moore.  In the end, Medellin establishes 
a new standard for presidential power in the “zone of twilight,” or at 
least severely restricts its use, and combined with Hamdan heralds a 
more formalistic application of Jackson’s taxonomy.136
 
supremacy for which there is no clear support.  See Barron & Lederman., supra note 
126, at 736 n.144 (arguing that a sliding scale disabling theory has no real 
jurisprudential basis). 
 132. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 717–19 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., 
dissenting) (citing footnote 23 in Hamdan for the proposition that Congress’s 
enactment of FISA and Title III disables President Bush’s warrantless wiretapping 
program absolutely). 
 133. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 592–93 & n.23 (majority opinion) (remarking that 
“[w]hether Chief Justice Chase was correct in suggesting that the President may 
constitutionally convene military commissions ‘without the sanction of Congress’ . . . 
is a question this Court . . . need not answer today,” and continuing later, “[w]hether 
or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to 
convene military commissions,” he must follow explicit congressional guidelines).  
Presumably, presidential enactment of military commissions “absent congressional 
authorization” would fall into the “zone of twilight.”  Id. at 593 n.23. 
 134. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra note 126, at 949 (arguing that history 
supports the assertion that the President is compelled to abide by legislative 
restrictions). 
 135. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (relating that the Court would have to disable Congress 
from acting on the measure entirely).  But see Barron & Lederman., supra note 126, 
at 693–94 (arguing that the most important issues in separation of powers 
jurisprudence will revolve around Jackson’s third category). 
 136. See infra Part III.B (asserting that Medellin eliminates the “zone of twilight” 
and, with a third category that disables Congress, resembles Justice Black’s test).  
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B. Medellin Eliminates the “Zone of Twilight” By Requiring Longstanding 
Congressional Support for Executive Action 
Medellin137 establishes a new interpretation of Jackson’s taxonomy 
by requiring a longstanding practice of congressional acquiescence to 
a specific executive action before it can exist in the “zone of 
twilight.”138  Chief Justice Roberts139 prefaced his analysis by quoting 
Justice Black’s majority opinion, that “[t]he President’s authority to 
act . . . ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself.’”140  This formalist quote provides the appropriate 
lens through which to view the rest of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
application of Jackson’s taxonomy. 
After reaffirming Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy as the “accepted 
framework for evaluating executive action in this area,”141 Chief 
Justice Roberts broke the analysis into two separate parts, focusing on 
the two claimed sources of presidential power—the “treaty power” 
and the “dispute- resolution” power—to enforce the ICJ ruling.142  
The first part eliminated the possibility of President Bush’s Executive 
Memorandum—obligating the states to follow the ICJ decision—
 137. The facts of Medellin are briefly as follows:  Jose Ernesto Medellin, the 
petitioner in the case, was convicted in Texas state court for murder.  Medellin v. 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008).  In violation of the VCCR, Medellin, a Mexican 
national, was not given consular access after he was arrested.  Id. at 1352.  In 2004, 
the ICJ ruled that the United States was obligated by the VCCR to give Medellin and 
fifty other Mexican nationals “review and reconsideration of their state-court 
convictions.”  Id.  In 2005, President Bush issued an Executive Memorandum stating 
that under his authority the United States would honor the ICJ ruling by obligating 
state courts to “give effect to the decision.”  Id. at 1353 (internal quotations omitted).  
Texas state courts refused to honor both the ICJ decision and the President’s 
Memorandum, in part because Medellin had not timely raised the Vienna 
Convention claim at trial, and because neither the ICJ nor the President has the 
authority to set aside state procedural rules.  Id. at 1356.  Medellin appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 1353. 
 138. See infra Part III.B (analyzing Chief Justice Roberts’s application of Jackson’s 
taxonomy). 
 139. In an aside, it is fitting that Chief Justice Roberts wrote the most exhaustive 
application of Jackson’s taxonomy since Dames & Moore, because Roberts clerked for 
Justice Rehnquist when Rehnquist penned Dames & Moore.  See The Justices of the 
Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008) (explaining that Roberts clerked for Rehnquist during the 
1980 term, the same term that Dames & Moore was decided).  This occurrence is even 
more remarkable for the fact that Rehnquist himself clerked for Justice Jackson when 
Jackson wrote his Youngstown concurrence.  See Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 752–53 
(relating that he was very familiar with Youngstown because he clerked for Justice 
Jackson when the case was decided). 
 140. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. (recounting how the United States argued that (1) the “relevant 
treaties give the President the authority to implement the Avena judgment and that 
Congress has acquiesced [to] such authority” and (2) that the President had a 
separate “international dispute-resolution” authority “wholly apart” from those 
“based on the pertinent treaties”). 
  
686 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:665 
                                                          
falling into Jackson’s first category and the second part eliminated 
the possibility of the Memorandum falling in the “zone of twilight” by 
restricting valid “zone of twilight” situations. 
1. Medellin’s application of Jackson’s Taxonomy to President Bush’s  
 authority to issue the Memorandum from “relevant treaties” 
The first argument advanced by the United States was that certain 
treaties give the President the authority to enforce the ICJ decision.143  
Essentially, the United States argued that the President was 
authorized to issue his Memorandum by the Optional Protocol and 
the United Nations Charter, either in Jackson’s first category or in 
the “zone of twilight,” because the treaties gave the President an 
implied power to implement the ICJ decision.144  Roberts rejected 
these arguments, placing the Memorandum firmly in Jackson’s third 
category.145
First, Roberts stated that Congress alone has the power to convert a 
non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one; the President 
cannot rely on implied powers to take an action that is reserved for 
Congress alone.146  Because the Court had already held that the 
relevant treaties were “non-self-executing”147 the President could not 
rely on them to place his Memorandum in the first category,148 having 
the “express or implied authorization” of Congress.149  As Chief 
Justice Roberts explained, if a treaty is ratified with “the 
understanding that it is not to have domestic . . . force,” one can 
hardly expect to use it as congressional support for giving it domestic 
force.150
Following this logic, Chief Justice Roberts further held that the 
President’s Memorandum could not fall into the “zone of twilight,” 
both because unilaterally enforcing a non-self-executing treaty would 
be against the “implied will” of Congress, and because there was no 
history of congressional acquiescence “remotely involv[ing] 
transforming an international obligation into domestic law and 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) [hereinafter 
Brief for the United States]). 
 145. See id. at 1368–69 (rejecting the United States’s assertion that the President’s 
Memorandum falls within the first category of the Youngstown structure). 
 146. Id. at 1369. 
 147. Id. at 1357. 
 148. Id. at 1369. 
 149. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 150. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1369. 
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thereby displacing state law.”151  Thus the President’s Memorandum 
falls into the third category, where it presumptively fails.152  Chief 
Justice Roberts concluded the “treaty power” analysis by stating that 
although the President might have the responsibility of complying 
with the treaty, he must find another way to do it.153
Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence on a history of acquiescence for 
the “zone of twilight” confirms the “‘longstanding practice’ of 
congressional acquiescence” standard more explicitly stated in Chief 
Justice Roberts’s analysis of the dispute resolution power.154  Similarly, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s requirement that any history of acquiescence 
be of the exact kind at issue in Medellin—namely, congressional 
acquiescence of presidential domestic enforcement of ICJ 
decisions—presages his rejection of the claims settlement cases as 
valid precedent.  In both arguments the government tried to show 
congressional acquiescence of a more generalized power, either 
 151. Id. at 1368, 1370.  
 152. Id. at 1369.  Chief Justice Roberts argues not only that Congress’s inherent 
power to execute “non-self-executing” treaties trumps any inherent powers that the 
President might have in this area, but by implication that the President has no 
inherent powers in this area.  See id. at 1371 (“[T]he Executive cannot unilaterally 
execute a non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic effect.”).  But see HENKIN, 
supra note 111, at 226–27 (emphasizing that several Supreme Court cases allow for 
executive domestic execution of international agreements).  Theoretically, this 
absolves a need to apply Jackson’s taxonomy at all as any action by the President 
along these lines would require “the express or implied authorization of Congress” 
found in the first category.  Cf. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 94–95 (pointing out that 
Jackson’s taxonomy does not address a case where Congress has exclusive power and 
the President has no authority to act). 
 153. But see Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1369 (“[T]he terms of a non-self-executing treaty 
can become domestic law only . . . through passage of legislation by both Houses of 
Congress.”).  Congress has yet another opportunity to take action in this case, 
although it is too late to benefit Jose Medellin.  See Request for Interpretation of the 
Judgment of 31 March 2004 In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Order of July 16, 2008), at 1, 3, 19, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2008) 
(ordering the United States to stay the execution of five Mexican nationals pursuant 
to its Avena holding and suggesting that Congress could pass legislation to comply 
with its international obligations); James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican 
Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A19 (reporting that Texas executed Jose 
Medellin after the Supreme Court rejected a last minute request for a stay of 
execution).  See generally Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www. 
scotusblog.com/wp/world-court-seeks-to-block-us-executions/ (July 16, 2008, 12:21 
EST) (detailing the new developments in the Avena case). 
 154. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (finding that the President’s Memorandum did 
not meet the requirement of “particularly longstanding practice” of congressional 
acquiescence for Presidential action in the “zone of twilight” to succeed); see also infra 
Part III.B (analyzing Chief Justice Roberts’s treatment of the claimed “dispute 
resolution” power).  Although Chief Justice Roberts focuses on congressional 
“quiescence,” he ignores “inertia” and “indifference,” also parts of Jackson’s “zone of 
twilight” definition.  Youngstown,  343 U.S. at 637  (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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treaty or dispute resolution, but in both cases Roberts required prior 
congressional acquiescence of a specific action.155
2. Medellin’s application of Jackson’s Taxonomy to President Bush’s 
 authority to issue the Memorandum from “inherent” dispute resolution 
 powers 
In arguing for an executive “dispute resolution” power, the 
government looked to the claims settlement cases156 for the 
proposition that the President has an independent foreign affairs 
authority to settle international disputes.157  Chief Justice Roberts 
analyzed this claim exclusively within the “zone of twilight”158 and 
held that this “independent source of authority” does not support the 
President’s actions in this case.159  In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts 
established a new standard for “zone of twilight” situations, 
theoretically restricting executive action either to Jackson’s first 
category or to when the President can point to a textual source of 
power in the Constitution. 
Chief Justice Roberts cited Dames & Moore for the premise that the 
claims settlement cases were “based on the view that ‘a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned’” could “‘raise a presumption 
that the [presidential] [action] had been [taken]’” with its consent.160  
 155. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1370–72 (requiring that the executive action be 
accomplished using an executive memorandum to transform an international 
obligation into a domestic obligation that displaces state law).  As the dissent points 
out, there are examples of congressional acquiescence to presidential authority 
“transforming an international obligation into domestic law and thereby displacing 
state law,” just not based on an ICJ opinion.  Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1370–71, 1390–91 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 230–31, 233–
34 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1937)). 
 156. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1371 (majority opinion) (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679–
80 (1981); Pink, 315 U.S. at 229; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330). 
 157. Id.; see Brief for the United States, supra note 144, at 16 (insisting that the 
President has an “established authority to resolve disputes with a foreign government 
over the claims of individuals”). 
 158. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (emphasizing before beginning the analysis of 
President Bush’s Memorandum that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme 
provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area”).  For 
the “treaty power” analysis, Chief Justice Roberts evaluates all three of Jackson’s 
categories; for the “dispute resolution” power, he only appears to examine 
congressional acquiescence, the catchword for the “zone of twilight” and the basis for 
the claims settlement cases.  Id. at 1371–72. 
 159. Id. at 1371. 
 160. Id. at 1371–72 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).  This 
premise is debatable, in part because two of the four cases cited by the Court, Pink, 
315 U.S. 203 and Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, drew from the President’s textually based 
“recognition power” as opposed to just an implied dispute settlement power.  Cf. 
HENKIN, supra note 111, at 227 (stating that the decisions in Belmont and Pink did not 
appear restricted to just recognition situations).  In addition, executive agreements 
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Chief Justice Roberts continued, stating that because President 
Bush’s Memorandum was “not supported by a ‘particularly 
longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence”—that it was in 
fact unprecedented—it was not like a claims settlement case and 
could not take the force of law.161
As it is unlikely that Chief Justice Roberts intended this strained 
interpretation, a better view is that in order to enable executive 
action in the “zone of twilight,” as the claims settlement cases did, the 
action would have to be “supported by a ‘particularly longstanding 
practice’ of congressional acquiescence.”162  Put another way, the 
presidential action would need to be “based on . . . ‘a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned.’”163  If accurate, this standard 
for presidential action in the “zone of twilight” would eliminate 
virtually all executive action not based on congressional acquiescence 
stretching back for however long “long pursued” means.164  
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence that the specific 
actions taken by the President have a history of congressional 
acquiescence suggests that finding this history will be difficult, 
especially where the President is responding to new or unforeseen 
situations.165
The advent of this new standard for the “zone of twilight,” coupled 
with the “disabling” Congress standard suggested by Hamdan, reveals 
 
taking the force of domestic law only date back to Belmont itself, which affirmed the 
relatively new concept of foreign relations supremacy over state law as the basis for its 
decision, not that Congress had acquiesced to the Executive’s action.  See Belmont, 
301 U.S. at 331 (“In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in 
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.”); HENKIN, supra note 
111, at 226–27 (stating that Belmont rejected the assertion that executive agreements 
did not take the force of domestic law and that both Belmont and Pink appeared to 
assert a generalized foreign policy supremacy). 
 161. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372.  This is a peculiar line of reasoning as the 
government was not arguing that Medellin was an actual claims settlement case, but 
rather that it was similar to the claims settlement cases in that it drew upon the 
President’s foreign affairs power to resolve disputes with other nations based on an 
international agreement.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 144, at 12–16 
(analogizing President Bush’s Memorandum to the claims settlement cases but 
actually arguing that the instant case represented less of a unilateral exercise of 
executive power—a “modest implementation authority”—than the claims settlement 
cases). 
 162. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 
396, 415 (2003)). 
 163. Id. at 1371–72 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)). 
 164. See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 415 (explaining that in the claims settlement 
cases congressional acquiescence was for “over 200 years”). 
 165. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (pointing out that although there 
was a history of executive action transforming international obligation into domestic 
law, Chief Justice Roberts refused to analogize that power to President Bush’s 
Memorandum). 
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a taxonomy less related to Jackson’s functionalist concurrence than 
to Justice Black’s starkly formalistic majority opinion.  In order to fall 
within the “zone of twilight,” the President must show a “systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned,” a standard that looks like the 
“implied authorization” located in the first category.166  The standard 
squeezes the first and third categories much closer together, 
practically touching, with the President only able to act 
independently of Congress where he can point to a textual source of 
power from the Constitution.167
Instead of Jackson’s three categories, the analysis could look more 
like this:  When the President acts with the express or implied 
authorization of Congress—including the implied blessing of a 
‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence—
his power is at its maximum; otherwise, he cannot act unless he can 
point to a textual source of power in the Constitution.168 This 
certainly seems to resemble Justice Black’s brisk refutation of 
presidential implied powers, in which he stated “[t]he President’s 
[authority] . . . [to act] must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself.”169
Neither Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown nor its subsequent 
application in Dames & Moore support such a stark and demanding 
standard for Jackson’s taxonomy.  Displaying his functionalist 
mindset, Jackson himself refused to set a definitive standard, 
remarking that “any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables,”170 and in 
addition to congressional “quiescence” also listed “inertia” and 
“indifference” as enabling presidential action.171  Jackson, along with 
a majority of his colleagues, left open the possibility that President 
Truman might have had the power to seize the mills in the absence of 
congressional action,  an Executive action that does not have a 
“particularly longstanding practice.”172  Additionally, examples that 
Jackson gave for “zone of twilight” situations were several Civil War 
 166. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1371–72. 
 167. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (relating examples of executive 
power based on constitutional text). 
 168. But see, e.g., Bellia, supra note 2, at 92 & n.25 (listing scholars who posit that 
when the President acts in foreign affairs in the face of congressional inaction—the 
“zone of twilight”—his actions are presumptively valid). 
 169. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
 170. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 377–78 n.15 (supposing that a majority of 
justices would have upheld executive action had there not been conflicting 
legislation). 
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cases where President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus in the face 
of “judicial challenge and doubt.”173  Although Congress eventually 
ratified President Lincoln’s actions, a President unilaterally 
suspending habeas was unprecedented, let alone a “particularly 
longstanding practice.”174
Dames & Moore also does not support this interpretation of the 
“zone of twilight.”  Justice Rehnquist repeatedly emphasized both the 
narrowness of Dames & Moore’s holding175 and the elasticity of 
Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy, particularly in situations “involving 
responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can 
hardly have been expected to anticipate in any detail.”176  A standard 
requiring a “particularly longstanding practice” does not seem 
especially elastic.  As mentioned above, while the Court in Dames & 
Moore quotes Frankfurter’s concurrence, it appears to do so as a 
standard reflective of claims settlement cases and sufficient for the 
“zone of twilight,” but not necessarily requisite.177
Because major separation of powers cases are relatively rare, and 
bona fide “zone of twilight” cases even rarer, it remains to be seen 
whether, or how soon, this new standard will have a real world effect.  
The next section will attempt to assess a few possible ramifications of 
this new standard, particularly as it applies to the executive foreign 
affairs and war powers. 
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NEW STANDARD ON SEPARATION-OF-
POWERS ISSUES AND EXECUTIVE ACTION 
Although the Supreme Court has rarely ruled on significant 
separation of powers issues between Congress and the President,178 it 
has recently shown a much greater willingness to both check 
presidential power and uphold Congress’s legislative mandate.179  In 
 173. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 n.3. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660, 688 (1981). 
 176. Id. at 669. 
 177. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (arguing, among other points, that 
Dames & Moore was a narrow holding focused on the facts at issue and was not 
attempting to set a specific “zone of twilight” standard). 
 178. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (citing various legal scholars 
remarking on the relative dearth of Supreme Court opinions rejecting executive 
assertions of power in the foreign affairs arena); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732–33 (1996) (recounting that the Supreme 
Court has historically rarely ruled on separation of powers cases but that such rulings 
“accelerated” with the Reagan administration, generally in the favor of executive 
power). 
 179. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368–69 (2008) (holding that the 
legislative power to execute a non-self-executing treaty is solely Congress’s and that 
President Bush cannot violate this separation of powers principle); Hamdan v. 
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this way Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy, as the “accepted framework 
for evaluating executive action,”180 may become more important and 
influential than it already is.  It follows, then, that a change in the 
“accepted framework” could profoundly affect the outcome of future 
cases. 
The new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy is applicable to any 
separation of powers dispute between Congress and the President, 
and indeed Jackson’s concurrence has been cited in such diverse 
opinions as Clinton v. New York,181 Mistretta v. United States,182 Morrison v. 
Olson,183 INS v. Chadha,184 and Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services.185  However, it is particularly applicable to foreign affairs and 
war powers cases.186  The powers of Congress and the President in 
domestic affairs are “allocated explicitly and according to an 
expressed principle,” but in “foreign affairs, much of the 
authority . . . is not explicitly allocated to either branch, and even the 
explicit division of power between President and Congress conforms 
to no ‘natural’ [principle].”187  Many of the Supreme Court cases 
explicitly applying Jackson’s taxonomy have been either foreign 
affairs188 or war powers189 cases, suggesting that in these types of cases, 
where power is mostly implied and mostly shared, Jackson’s 
taxonomy is especially useful. 
 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 616 (2006) (insisting that the President cannot contravene 
various “requirements” legislated by Congress); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Setting 
the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2352 (2006) (claiming that Hamdan was the first 
step in reversing a trend of unremitted executive power aggrandization set into 
motion by the Bush Administration); Seth Weinberger, Restoring the Balance:  The 
Hamdan Decision and Executive War Powers, 42 TULSA L. REV. 681, 692 (2007) (arguing 
that Hamdan served as a check on executive power and restored the balance between 
congressional and presidential war powers). 
 180. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368. 
 181. 524 U.S. 417, 435 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 182. 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). 
 183. 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988). 
 184. 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 185. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
 186. See infra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
 187. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 87. 
 188. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371–72 (2008) (applying Jackson’s 
taxonomy to hold that neither the relevant treaties nor the executive foreign affairs 
powers allow the President to enforce the ICJ decision on the states); Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675, 686 (1981) (adopting Jackson’s taxonomy and 
holding that the actions of Presidents Carter and Reagan were valid pursuant to the 
executive foreign affairs powers and fell either into the first category or the “zone of 
twilight”). 
 189. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590–93 & n.23 (2006) (citing 
Jackson’s concurrence for the assertion that congressional legislation overrides use 
of the executive war power); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
641-43 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (holding that the President’s war powers do 
not allow him to seize steel mills in the face of contrary legislation). 
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A. The New Standard and War Powers 
The new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy established by Hamdan 
and Medellin will likely affect war powers disputes less than foreign 
affairs disputes.  As one author notes, Congress has for the most part 
moved war powers issues from the “zone of twilight” into Jackson’s 
third category by passing comprehensive legislation.190  Even before 
Hamdan it was difficult for the President to succeed in the third 
category, as the Court would have to “disabl[e] the Congress from 
acting upon the subject.”191  Apparently, the United States did not 
even argue this point in Hamdan.192  However, one interesting 
outcome of Hamdan is the effect it could have on the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973 or another similar provision.193
The War Powers Resolution was passed after President Nixon 
continued bombing Cambodia after Congress repealed the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution, which had given President Nixon the original 
authority to bomb Cambodian territory.194  The War Powers 
Resolution placed much of the President’s war powers into the third 
of Jackson’s categories,195 requiring the President to “consult”196 with 
and “report”197 to Congress before and after introduction of troops 
into battle.  Additionally, it required the President to withdraw troops 
from battle after sixty days unless Congress has declared war or 
passed a joint resolution authorizing the conflict.198  President Nixon 
vetoed the War Powers Resolution, claiming it was unconstitutional,199 
but Congress passed the law despite his objection.200  Despite the clear 
intent of Congress to check presidential power through the War 
 190. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105 (stating that legislation passed by Congress 
after the Vietnam war left presidential war powers in Jackson’s third category); 
Daniel J. Freeman, Note, The Canons of War, 117 YALE L.J. 280, 283 (2007) (arguing 
that executive action in this area now comes down to a statutory interpretation 
analysis). 
 191. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38. 
 192. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23. 
 193. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006). 
 194. See Gary Minda, Congressional Authorization and Deauthorization of War:  Lessons 
From the Vietnam War, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 943, 983–84 (2007) (explaining that the War 
Powers Resolution was intended to “rein in” executive war powers). 
 195. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105. 
 196. 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
 197. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a). 
 198. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).  See generally HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105–11 
(describing the motivations for, and criticisms of, the War Powers Resolution, and its 
subsequent effect on executive action). 
 199. E.g., Weinberger, supra note 179, at 689 (asserting that no President after 
Nixon accepted the War Power Resolution’s constitutionality). 
 200. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105–07. 
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Powers Resolution,201 its strictures have largely been ignored or 
avoided by the executive branch.202
Although the War Powers Resolution now appears largely 
irrelevant,203 and likely unconstitutional,204 there is every possibility 
that it or a similar resolution205 could be used to challenge executive 
authority to assert Commander in Chief powers contrary to the 
express will of Congress.  In such a situation, an analysis under the 
new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy would likely “disable” the 
President from exercising his war powers in a way contrary to the 
relevant legislation, despite the strong arguments for presidential 
power in this area.206
B. The New Standard and Foreign Affairs Powers 
It is in the area of foreign affairs, where the power is most implied 
and concurrent between the branches, that the new Jackson 
taxonomy standard could have its greatest effect.207  Although the 
President has been described as the “sole organ of the nation in its 
external relations,”208 and that “the external powers of the United 
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies,”209 it 
is now unlikely that future presidential actions pursuant to the 
executive foreign affairs power will have domestic effect, apart from 
 201. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 222 (referring to the War Powers Resolution 
when stating that “Congress has adopted a standing statutory rule [against] any . . . 
inference” that presidential war powers might exist in the “zone of twilight”). 
 202. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 109–10 (describing various measures that 
Presidents have taken to either avoid or ignore the War Powers Resolution). 
 203. See Minda, supra note 194, at 984–85 (remarking that “presidents have 
refused to honor the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, and that neither 
Congress nor the courts have seemed to care”). 
 204. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 111, at 107–08, 125–27 (noting that INS v. Chadha 
holds all legislative vetoes presumptively unconstitutional, including the provision in 
the War Powers Resolution allowing Congress to terminate hostilities through a 
concurrent resolution). 
 205. See James A. Baker, III & Warren Christopher, Op-Ed., Put War Powers Back 
Where They Belong, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at A21 (attempting to inspire efforts to 
pass a new and better written war powers resolution that would be more palatable to 
the executive branch and easier to implement by Congress). 
 206. See, e.g., John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other Means:  The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 170, 174 (1996) (arguing that Congress 
could oppose “executive war decisions only by exercising its powers over funding and 
impeachment”).  But see HENKIN, supra note 111, at 107 (“I do not perceive any 
constitutional objections to the Resolution in principle.”). 
 207. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 95 (implying that the “zone of twilight” was 
especially large in foreign affairs, stating that “surely [in foreign affairs], where the 
President admittedly has large power, the fact that Congress can act does not, of 
itself, prove that the President could not”). 
 208. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 209. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). 
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narrowly described claims settlement cases.210  For good or ill, the 
requirement that there be a “particularly longstanding practice”211 of 
congressional acquiescence to a given presidential action could 
potentially circumscribe many courses of action that the President 
might take.212
One example of a situation where the new standard might have 
circumscribed executive action is when President Carter, claiming an 
inherent foreign affairs power, unilaterally terminated a treaty 
between the United States and Taiwan.213  The power to terminate a 
treaty is not specifically allocated in the Constitution, although the 
power certainly exists, and both Congress and the President have 
claimed the power to do so.214  Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
rule on the merits in Goldwater v. Carter,215 it is now fairly well accepted 
that the President does have the power to unilaterally terminate a 
treaty.216  However, applying the new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy 
reaches a different conclusion.  Congress has never explicitly given 
the President the generalized power to unilaterally terminate a treaty, 
and although there were several instances of a President terminating 
a treaty without congressional approval before Goldwater, there was 
nothing approaching a “particularly longstanding practice” of 
congressional acquiescence.217  This puts President Carter’s action in 
the third category, which under the new standard would result in a 
nullification of his action as the Constitution does not specifically 
allocate the power to terminate a treaty to the President.218
 210. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008). 
 211. Id. (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)). 
 212. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 95 (“Presidents, we have seen, have acted 
unilaterally in foreign affairs matters which Congress might undoubtedly have 
regulated, where Congress had not in fact done so.”). 
 213. See id. at 213–14 (explaining that when several members of Congress brought 
suit arguing that President Carter did not have the constitutional power to 
unilaterally terminate a treaty, the Supreme Court refused to rule on the merits but 
that the power of the President to unilaterally terminate a treaty is now well 
established (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979))). 
 214. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 211–13 & nn.142–43 (indicating that although 
the United States rarely terminates treaties, Congress has occasionally asserted its 
authority to do so); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power 
Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 249–50 (2001) (pointing out that, like most 
foreign affairs powers, the Constitution does not specifically assign the power to 
terminate a treaty). 
 215. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 216. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 214 (“At the end of the twentieth century, it is 
apparently accepted that the President has authority under the Constitution to 
denounce or otherwise terminate a treaty . . . .”). 
 217. See id. at 213 (“[T]he United States has not often been disposed to terminate 
treaties.”); id. at 212 & n.138 (stating that President Lincoln was the first President to 
terminate a treaty, although that was later approved by Congress, and explaining that 
President Roosevelt also denounced several other treaties). 
 218. Supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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A more recent controversy involving executive foreign affairs 
powers concerned not the termination of an international obligation, 
as in Goldwater, but instead the creation of an international 
obligation, in this case President Bush’s attempt to reach a new status 
of forces agreement (“SOFA”) with Iraq through an executive 
agreement.219  Although SOFAs have historically been entered into by 
the President through executive agreements and without the specific 
authorization of Congress,220 critics argued that this particular SOFA 
agreed to much more than previous SOFAs have and could prolong 
the United States’s involvement in Iraq without Congress’s 
approval.221
President Bush has admitted that this particular agreement will not 
likely be made,222 but the new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy would 
have invalidated it and would not allow for any similar agreement 
contemplated by future Presidents.223  Congress has not allocated to 
the President the power to make such a SOFA agreement224 nor is 
there a “particularly longstanding practice” of congressional 
acquiescence to this type of SOFA agreement.225  This would leave the 
SOFA agreement in the third category, and because the President has 
no textually derived power to make executive agreements, the SOFA 
 219. See generally Michael Abramowitz, Democrats Attack Iraq Security Proposal, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 24, 2008, at A9 (reporting that President Bush faced strong opposition 
from Democrats in Congress who feared that he was trying use an executive 
agreement to keep the United States in Iraq indefinitely). 
 220. Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, An Agreement Without Agreement, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/ 
2008/02/15/AR2008021502539.html. 
 221. See id. (explaining that this agreement would give civilian contractors working 
in Iraq immunity for any crime they commit, something that no SOFA had done 
before, and that through this SOFA, President Bush unilaterally “threatens to deepen 
the American commitment” in Iraq). 
 222.  See Campbell Robertson & Stephen Farrell, Pact, Approved in Iraq, Sets Time for 
U.S. Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, November 17, 2008, at A1 (describing the new SOFA 
between the United States and Iraq, an agreement different from the one discussed 
in this Comment in that it set a timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal and eliminated 
controversial provisions like prosecutorial immunity for U.S. troops and contractors 
who commit certain crimes in Iraq). 
 223. See Steven Lee Myers, Bush, in a Shift, Accepts Concept of Iraq Timeline, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2008, at A1 (explaining that given Iraqi opposition to the terms of the 
SOFA agreement the Bush administration decided to forgo the agreement in its 
initial form). 
 224. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2008/03/what-do-authorizations-for-use-of.html (Mar. 7, 2008, 12:38 EST) (pointing 
out that President Bush has not shown legislative support for the SOFA but has used 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and other statutes as support for 
continuing combat operations in Iraq). 
 225. See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 220 (arguing that the terms of this 
SOFA are unprecedented and so President Bush cannot rely on previous SOFA 
agreements for support). 
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would likely fail.226  That this new standard is different from the old 
standard is particularly clear when compared to Dames & Moore, 
where the Supreme Court was willing to extend congressional 
acquiescence for one type of claims settlement agreement to include 
another never seen before, that being the “suspension” of claims in 
court.227
Indeed, Dames & Moore itself might have turned out much different 
had this new standard been applied faithfully.  Although claims 
settlement by executive agreement in general had a long history,228 
the Court could show no examples of the specific action taken by 
President Reagan in the “zone of twilight,” such as suspending claims 
pending in district court.229  In addition, strictly speaking the Algiers 
Accords were not executive agreements but instead “declarations” 
drafted by the United States, issued by the Algerian Government, and 
recognized as executive agreements by the Supreme Court.230  A court 
applying the new standard would find no legislation granting 
President Reagan the power to “suspend” claims, and no “particularly 
longstanding practice” of congressional acquiescence to either 
“suspension” of claims or the type of executive agreement at issue.  
 226. Cf. id. (noting that the President’s Commander in Chief powers only cover 
members of the armed forces, not civilian contractors).  That at least some members 
of Congress were definitely against the SOFA is also demonstrated by a bill 
introduced by Senator Clinton that, had it been passed, would have sharply restricted 
the President’s ability to conclude such an agreement.  See Congressional Oversight 
of Iraq Agreements Act of 2007, S. 2426, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (mandating that (1) 
the President report to Congress his reasons for not submitting the SOFA for 
congressional ratification, and demonstrate through legal analysis how his executive 
powers derived from the Constitution justify those reasons, and (2) that no funds be 
authorized to support any agreement with Iraq that is not ratified by two-thirds of the 
Senate). 
 227. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (finding no previous examples of 
executive “suspension” of claims pending in court). 
 228. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 & n.8, 680 (1981) 
(explaining that Presidents have been agreeing to international executive 
agreements since at least 1799).  But see HENKIN, supra note 111, at 226–27 (stating 
that executive agreements taking the force of law within U.S. territory only came 
about with Belmont and Pink).  Whether congressional acquiescence of executive 
agreements taking the force of domestic law was “particularly longstanding” by the 
time Dames & Moore was decided might therefore be up for conjecture. 
 229. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (pointing out that suspension of 
claims was unique expression of the claims settlement power at the time of Dames & 
Moore). 
 230. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 663–64; see D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 292 n.4 
(explaining that the government of Iran would not sign any agreement with “the 
Great Satan”).  See generally D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 292 & nn.1-2, & 4 (relating that 
the executive agreement in Dames & Moore, known as the Algiers Accords, was agreed 
to by the United States in order to free American hostages held by the Iranian 
government following the storming of the U.S. embassy in Iran by a “terrorist student 
group” in 1979). 
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This would leave the Algiers Accords in the last category where it 
would fail despite its great importance and pressing need.231
CONCLUSION 
In the words of Louis Henkin, “Justice Jackson did not tell us, or 
offer a principle that might help us determine, which powers are 
concurrent” in the “zone of twilight” with respect to foreign affairs.232  
Forecasting the effects of this new standard on future presidential 
action in the “zone of twilight” is similarly difficult as the President 
“exercis[es] the executive authority in a world that presents each day 
some new challenge with which he must deal.”233  Perhaps Justice 
Jackson had this reality in mind he said of the “zone of twilight,” “[i]n 
this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than 
on abstract theories of law.”234  By restricting the “zone of twilight” to 
a relatively static definition, Medellin may invalidate presidential 
action that, although constitutionally permissible, is mandated by 
“the imperatives of events”235 rather than dependent on a “particularly 
longstanding practice” of congressional acquiescence.236
Whether or not this is the case, future Supreme Court opinions 
dealing with executive power and applying Jackson’s taxonomy as 
“the accepted framework” should make it clear whether the changes 
to Jackson’s taxonomy made by Hamdan and Medellin were 
intentional.  Specifically, the Court should specify whether (1) 
Congress has a complete disabling power in the third category and 
(2) valid executive actions in the “zone of twilight” now require a 
long history of congressional acquiescence.  In the meantime, the 
practical effect of Medellin and Hamdan is to alter Jackson’s taxonomy 
from three parts to two, from the functionalism of Justice Jackson to 
the formalism of Justice Black. 
 
 231. See id. at 293 (explaining that the Court in Dames & Moore was concerned that 
a different result would have “done considerable damage to the President’s ability to 
deal with foreign sovereigns”). 
 232. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 95. 
 233. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662. 
 234. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008) (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)). 
